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Precarity and Petrochemicals: Envisioning a Future through Uncertainty 
Francie Sentilles 
(Under the direction of Rudolf Colloredo-Mansfeld) 
  
Although demand for petroleum products extends across the globe, oil extraction is 
concentrated in areas with abundant subterranean resources. The industry’s volatile global 
market introduces precarity in these regions’ economies, and its destructive environmental 
practices further compound uncertainties. Michael Cepek, Suzana Sawyer, and Arlie Russell 
Hochschild have each assessed political responses to petrochemicals’ effects, finding that 
economic benefits often outweigh environmental concerns. However, the 2014-16 drop in oil 
prices led to layoffs and pay cuts that contradicted the narrative that oil provides stable, middle-
class jobs in extraction sites. This paper analyzes shifting relationships with the petrochemical 
industry in South Louisiana and Ciudad del Carmen, Mexico as people confront the downturn in 
the oil market. Through interviews and participant observation with oil beneficiaries in both 
sites, I explore how they made trade-offs and lifestyle changes to build security in the face of 












 “I have to move out of this house soon, to higher ground,” Jacob1 told me one evening 
over dinner in his kitchen. “We’ve lived here since the boys were kids, but the water comes up 
further into our yard every spring.” Jacob was living on a quiet street in a middle-class suburb of 
Houma, Louisiana with his wife and two sons. Their family had three cars, two dogs, and money 
to spare on activities like eating out and going to the movies. They lived the quintessential 
middle-class American life, but Jacob frequently alluded the precariousness of their situation. 
Flooding in the spring and hurricanes in the fall constantly threatened their home; even if they 
were financially secure, their lives could be transformed by one bad storm. 
Jacob had worked in the oil industry since his early twenties, when he dropped out of a 
four-year degree program because he couldn’t afford tuition. He started out as a deck hand, 
taking care of a boat that he lived on for three weeks out of every month. Over time, he gained 
skills and attended community college classes. When I visited his family in the summer of 2019, 
he was five hours short of an associate’s degree and working 12-hour shifts at a petrochemical 
plant an hour from home. His youngest son, Matt, had just graduated high school and planned to 
pursue an associate’s degree at a nearby college. Matt’s brother, Sam, was also about to start an 
associate’s program at age 20, after dropping out of a nearby four-year college and briefly 
working on a tug boat. 
It initially surprised me that all three men were completing associate’s degrees at the 
same time, but the job market in South Louisiana was becoming more and more competitive. 
Between 2014 and 2016, oil prices dropped by 70 percent, abruptly transforming the South 
Louisiana economy and restricting employment opportunities (Stocker, Baffes, and Vorisek 
                                               
1 The names of research participants have been changed to pseudonyms for their privacy. 
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2018). Further, major disasters like Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill (2010) loomed large in people’s minds, especially as they began confronting the less 
immediate ecologic changes brought on by the oil industry. 
 Despite his stable income and middle-class lifestyle, the combined effects of a downturn 
in the oil industry and the ever-growing threat of climate change brought uncertainty into Jacob’s 
life. Searching for a new home on higher ground, working 50-60 hours each week, and pursuing 
a degree were choices Jacob made to preserve his family’s life in Louisiana, even as the spaces 
around him deteriorated. These steps were his solution to an important question for oil workers 
during the industry’s downturn: How do we maintain our lifestyle and plan for the future in the 
midst of uncertainty? 
The problem of communities, oil, and thinking about the future 
  Jacob’s choices are not representative of an entire sector of the workforce, but they 
reflect a sense of precariousness inherent in an industry that often dominates local economies but 
depends extensively on global forces. Given the global nature of the oil industry, the 
vulnerability of Louisiana’s oil 
workers cannot be seen in a vacuum; 
rather, they operate as part of a diverse 
workforce scattered around the globe, 
but concentrated in a few regions 
where hydrocarbon deposits lie below 
the ground. One of these places is 
Ciudad del Carmen, a city directly 
south of Louisiana, on an island off of  
Red stars on this map indicate the locations of Ciudad del Carmen and 
Morgan City. Source: welt-atlas.de 
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Mexico’s Gulf Coast.  
With similar economic histories and shared participation in the Gulf of Mexico’s oil 
industry, Ciudad del Carmen and South Louisiana were ideal comparative sites for exploring 
how cultural and economic factors influence oil workers’ decisions and expectations for the 
future. In both sites, the combination of declining oil prices and mounting evidence for climate 
change threaten people’s careers and livelihoods.  
Politically, the oil industry in the United States and Mexico appear entirely distinct. In the 
U.S., oil is drilled, refined, and traded on a free market with a series of government regulations 
that, depending on who you ask, may or may not be adequate for protecting workers and local 
communities from chemicals. Political questions center around how extensive the government’s 
role should be in regulating the industry. In Mexico, the state-run oil company Petróleos 
Mexicanos (Pemex) manages all oil production, so the country’s oil industry can radically 
change with a new national government. Mexico’s political questions involve choices about 
whether private companies should be permitted to drill in Mexican territory and how the 
government will manage occupational safety and environmental protections at Pemex.  
While the two systems differ in their approach to oil regulation, people’s concerns at the 
end of the day are the same: Will chemicals from the oil industry interfere with my health, my 
workplace, and my environment? Will the oil industry advance economic development for my 
community? Will it improve my personal financial situation? And most importantly, do I have 
any say in how oil is produced and managed? 
Arlie Russell Hochschild’s Strangers in Their Own Land analyzes such concerns in 
Louisiana through residents’ interactions with politics and the environment. In particular, she 
explores the contradiction between their anxieties about environmental degradation and their 
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enthusiastic support for government deregulation. As she writes, “The logic was this. The more 
oil, the more jobs. The more jobs, the more prosperity, and the less need for government aid. 
And the less people depend on government—local, state, or federal—the better off they will be” 
(Hochschild 2016, 73). They have identified oil companies as their allies and the government as 
an enemy in their pursuit of independent, middle-class lives. In Michael Cepek’s ethnography of 
an indigenous Amazonian community in Ecuador, the Cofán initially find no allies. In Life in 
Oil, Cepek describes how the Cofán people gained worldwide attention for protesting oil 
extraction that polluted their territory, threatening their health and livelihoods. Yet, eventually, 
they welcomed the oil company back onto their land in exchange for jobs, ultimately finding 
space to ally with them in their aspirations for economic progress, much like South Louisiana’s 
oil workers (Cepek 2018).  Overall, these examples illustrate how communities can become 
deeply intertwined with and dependent upon the oil industry, even as they criticize it for 
damaging their land. 
In this thesis, I extend these authors’ observations around oil dependency, assessing what 
happens when oil-dependent communities lose faith in the industry’s long-term capacity to 
support them. The petrochemical industry has been unreliable in recent years. Layoffs and pay 
cuts have forced many to search for work elsewhere, leaving locals in Louisiana and Ciudad del 
Carmen to contend with shrinking cities and diminishing economic prospects. Like Jacob, many 
made lifestyle changes to preserve what they could from more prosperous times in the oil 
industry. This paper will analyze residents’ decision-making in the face of this uncertainty: How 
did they plot careers in an industry where career skills bind one to growing risks of disruption 
and loss?  What expectations of the future—for the industry, the environment, and their 
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hometowns—guided their decisions? And what sacrifices were deemed worthwhile to maintain a 
middle-class lifestyle? 
I argue that the precariousness of the oil industry since 2014 has led to trade-offs and 
sacrifice becoming central to oil beneficiaries’ explanations of decisions both large and small. 
Younger people have begun to experiment with jobs beyond the oil industry and to question the 
longevity of petroleum’s dominance in their local economies. Meanwhile, mid-career 
professionals have honed in on their priorities to maintain what they can of a middle-class 
lifestyle as support from petrochemicals becomes less reliable. While Cepek and Hochschild’s 
studies center political responses to oil’s threats, I found that many oil-dependent individuals 
focused instead on making personal choices to build security in an unreliable economy.  
Background and methodology 
I spent the summer of 2019 conducting interviews and participant observation in Ciudad 
del Carmen and Southeast Louisiana, where I focused on beneficiaries of the oil industry. Out of 
21 participants (9 in Louisiana, 12 in Mexico), 18 had worked in the petrochemical industry in 
some capacity or were currently working in the industry. One participant in Ciudad del Carmen 
received a college scholarship provided by a chemical producer, another owned a hotel that 
housed many transient oil workers, and one participant in Louisiana sold a large plot of land to a 
petrochemical company. My youngest participants at both sites were 20 years old, while the 
oldest were in their 70s. Most were in their 40s and 50s. 
 My study began with three weeks in Louisiana, using family relationships to connect 
with individuals in the oil industry for interviews. I connected with whomever was available and 
had a connection to the industry, leaving town with a total of nine interviews. I then spent five 
weeks in Mexico, where my landlord and contacts at a local non-profit helped me identify 
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interviewees. In Mexico, I sought to match characteristics of the Louisiana group by reaching out 
to individuals of a similar age group, socioeconomic status, and gender balance. I chose not to 
match by job type because there were differences in employment opportunities and education 
status between the two sites, which are captured by my interviewees’ work experiences. 
Unsurprisingly, the participants were mostly male, but I interviewed 3 women in Mexico and 2 
in Louisiana. 
I implemented a life-story interview structure for the first half of each interview, using 
the participants’ life experiences to learn about the impact of the oil industry on their 
hometowns. In the second half of the interviews, I transitioned to questions about the broader 
context of the oil industry and participants’ opinions about the outcomes of petrochemical 
production. Interviews were generally 15-20 minutes long, with an overall range of 9.5 to 35 
minutes. 
In addition to interviews, experiences with my family in Southeastern Louisiana have 
helped me to elucidate how people make decisions with the oil industry dominating the local 
economy. Both of my paternal grandparents grew up along the Mississippi River, in towns where 
petrochemical plants now line the riverfront. My grandfather was a strong student, and after they 
married, they moved away for him to pursue a Ph.D. They raised my father and his sister outside 
of Louisiana, but all of their cousins are still in the area today, and most work in petrochemicals. 
My dad moved back to New Orleans for college and law school, where he found an in-between 
space that allowed him to connect with family while remaining in the white-collar world he 
knew outside of Louisiana.  
My grandmother returned to her hometown in 1999, the year I was born, and much like 
my father, I grew up experiencing rural Louisiana through brief visits with extended family. I 
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was always aware of the oil industry’s hold on the area. Even as a toddler, I remember being 
intrigued by the clouds rising from the smoke stacks along the Mississippi River as we drove up 
to my grandmother’s house. When I began studying environmental health science, I yearned to 
understand how my grandmother’s and cousins’ communities confronted the health risks 
associated with such emissions.  
Thus, this research is rooted in my family’s experiences, both because of my interest in 
how their lives diverge from mine and because of my reliance upon them to teach me about 
South Louisiana. They connected me with most of my interview contacts in Louisiana, framing 
my study around their communities. Because of the highly segregated social lives of many South 
Louisiana residents, this means that non-White voices are entirely missing from my study 
population. Black and indigenous residents in Louisiana often suffer from the worst of oil’s 
environmental effects and benefit the least from its positive economic effects; in general, these 
groups are underrepresented among the group of middle-class oil workers that is the focus of this 
study. Their experiences cannot be represented by the narratives of my family and their social 
circles, but demands for environmental justice by Black and indigenous communities in 
Louisiana have been documented elsewhere and merit further attention (Roberts and Toffolon-
Weiss 2001; Greene 2008). 
This project grew from curiosity about my family’s experiences with oil in Louisiana, 
and the portion of the project focused on the United States largely centers around their 
community; however, the inclusion of Ciudad del Carmen as a comparative site brings their 
stories into a global context of an oil industry that centers around volatile market forces. My 
status as a partial insider in one site and a complete outsider in the other helped me to identify 
knowledge gaps about South Louisiana and components of my research questions that I may 
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have otherwise overlooked. However, my family connections also color my perceptions of 
Louisiana and the people who live there. As a “halfie,” described by Lila Abu-Lughod as 
anthropologists whose cultural identities are partially shared with those of research subjects, my 
personal identity affects my objectivity in ways that a complete outsider would not be influenced 
(Abu-Lughod 1991, 137). Consequently, I have implemented Abu-Lughod’s suggestion of 
avoiding generalizations, focusing instead on the particularities of my settings and my 
participants’ lives (Abu-Lughod 1991). Where appropriate, I also explain my own experiences 
with my family and the petrochemical industry in order to address my personal relationship with 
the material from Louisiana. 
The Gulf, oil and environmental risks 
The petrochemical industry first came to Louisiana more than a century ago, thanks to the 
transportation benefits provided by the Mississippi River and the favorable political climate for 
building industrial facilities. By 1918, Standard Oil’s largest refinery was located in Baton 
Rouge, cementing the oil giant’s influence in the state (Allen 2006, 114). With control of the 
Mississippi River for transit, and alliances with local political leaders, a few major oil companies 
controlled the vast reserves in the Sabine Uplift, an area stretching from northern Louisiana to 
Texas. Since that time, the industry has grown dramatically. Now, the 85-mile stretch between 
Baton Rouge and New Orleans is home to over 150 petrochemical production facilities (Juhasz 
2019). These factories provide well-paying jobs for residents, but they also release dangerous 
chemicals into the environment. 
Now, Louisiana is sinking. As shown by the map on the next page, the state’s 
Southeastern edge is speckled with waterways that are quickly encroaching on the region’s land. 
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These marshes along the Gulf of Mexico 
hold major economic importance, as the 
second-largest fishery in the country and 
the home of the American oil and gas 
industry. In the early 2000s, the state of 
Louisiana began working to reverse this 
coastal damage. In assessments of how the 
marshes became so eroded, researchers      named the control of waterways and the 
construction of pipelines in the area for oil and gas transportation as primary factors in the area’s 
ecologic changes (Christen 2004). 
Confounding the coastal erosion problem is pollution from the petrochemical plants 
throughout the state.  The 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill – the largest spill in human history 
– is the harshest example of the industry’s contamination of Louisiana’s natural resources, but 
chemical spills were not new to the area. According to Jack Davis’s The Gulf, there have been an 
average of 285 chemical spills annually in the Gulf of Mexico since 1985 (Davis 2017, 516). The 
effects of these chemicals are further compounded by lax emissions regulations in Louisiana. In 
2012, the state produced 31 pounds of toxic releases per person into the air, water, and land – 
nearly three times the national average (Davis 2017). Even if land protection programs can keep 
the Gulf Coast intact and above the water level, these emissions could derail ecosystem repairs 
and have drastic effects on human health. 
The EPA’s 2014 National Air Toxics Assessment (NATA) found that many of the 
country’s most highly polluted tracts are in towns along the portion of the Mississippi River 
between New Orleans and Baton Rouge. In one tract in this zone, cancer risk from air emissions 
Source: “Our Land and Water: A Regional Approach to Adaptation,” 
2019, Louisiana’s Strategic Adaptation for Future Envi onments 
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is 800/1,000,000, more than 16 times higher than the norm throughout Louisiana of 25-
50/1,000,000 (“2014 National Air Toxics Assessment Map” 2014). For a more specific example, 
the NATA results show that the plant nearest to my grandmother’s home releases arsenic, lead, 
benzene, chloride, formaldehyde, and several other chemicals into the air (“2014 National Air 
Toxics Assessment Map” 2014). Many of these are known to pose significant health risks. 
Benzene and arsenic are both known human carcinogens, but they are not well-regulated in 
Louisiana. Between 1988 and 2013, a single plant in Norco, LA released almost 2 million 
pounds of benzene and jeopardized the health of communities near the facility (Ottinger, Spears, 
and Orff 2013). 
With less oil production and economic development, ecologic degradation in Mexico’s 
southern edge of the Gulf is not as widely studied. However, Ciudad del Carmen is a center of oil 
production in the country, and like most islands, it has a very low altitude. A 2013 report by the 
World Bank classified Ciudad del Carmen as the city in Campeche most vulnerable to rising sea 
levels (Damirasala et al. 2013). With just a half-meter rise in sea levels, 22% of the city and 
2,000 homes would be underwater (Francisco 2009). Because Ciudad del Carmen has always 
revolved around offshore drilling, compared to Louisiana’s extensive history of terrestrial oil 
wells, environmental degradation has not yet taken a major toll on the town and surrounding 
human settlements. 
Still, both Louisiana and Campeche’s fisheries have suffered as a result of oil’s 
expansion. A 2017 article by Ignacio Fariza for Spanish-language newspaper El Pais provides an 
overview of oil’s economic effects on Ciudad del Carmen, particularly since the 2014 oil price 
plummet. He writes that “el crudo ha difuminado la otrora próspera industria camaronera, con 
amplias zonas de exclusión para que operen las plataformas” [crude oil has overridden the 
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otherwise thriving shrimp industry, with extensive exclusion zones for oil operations] (Fariza 
2017). By blocking off sections of the sea from fishing activity, oil eventually overtook the 
town’s economy. Efraín Caldera Noreiga, an archivist and author dedicated to preserving Ciudad 
del Carmen’s history, writes about the relationship between oil and shrimp fishing in the town in 
his most recent book. He refers to them as “Las últimas dos épocas de prosperidad en Carmen” 
[The two recent periods of prosperity in Carmen] and highlights the instability associated with 
transitioning from shrimp to oil, a nonrenewable source of economic growth. He writes, 
Es posible que en un futuro Carmen regrese al mar, tal como es su tradición, en la busca 
de sus recursos naturales una vez que se hayan agotado los yacimientos de 
hidrocarburos que hay todavía en la Sonda de Campeche, por ello estas dos industrias 
no deben de estar en contradicción, pues del cuidado del medio ambiente marino 
depende el relevo de una nueva fuente de trabajo alternativa. (Noreiga 2019, 153) 
 
It is possible that in the future Carmen will return to the sea, as is her tradition, in search 
of natural resources once the hydrocarbon deposits still present in the Campeche Probe 
have been depleted. Therefore, these two industries must not be in contradiction, as 
caring for the marine environment depends on the transition to a new, alternate source of 
work.  
 
Regardless of how the industry evolves in the future, both Fariza and Caldera Noreiga make 
clear that oil replaced Ciudad del Carmen’s thriving shrimp industry with an economy that has 
been both more prosperous and less predictable. 
Politics, culture, and oil-dependent communities  
Anthropological literature on oil is filled with stories of resistance to petrochemical 
production; petroleum is frequently presented as a power imposed upon communities, taking 
away their autonomy over land and natural resources. Watts’s “A Tale of Two Gulfs” distills 
social science perspectives on oil into three categories, each of which critiques the oil industry 
for not advancing development, spurring unsustainable capitalist practices, or creating a 
dangerous level of dependence on a finite resource. The first critique laments the “resource 
 12 
curse,” which describes the phenomenon of oil revenues being captured by political elites 
through state-run oil companies rather than building a middle class. The second group of 
arguments remark upon the contradiction between capitalism’s need for constant growth and the 
fact that oil constantly becomes less abundant and more expensive to obtain. Finally, Watts 
describes how a third group of social scientists concern themselves with the dependence of 
“modern life” (and particularly American lifestyles) on oil, noting that “Oil underwrites modern 
life, but the social cost is addiction…the terrible costs of which are now clear: carbon emissions 
and global warming, the assumption of new technological and environmental risks as 
unconventional sources are exploited, and continued dependence on parts of the world that, as 
Dick Cheney famously noted, do not have U.S. oil interests at heart” (Watts 2012, 439). This 
third argument, in essence, foreshadows that oil’s instability will soon be felt on American 
shores, as it already has been in less-economically developed countries.  
Much of anthropology’s focus within oil has been on individual communities responding 
to these three challenges through protest and resistance. Michael Cepek’s Life in Oil and 
Behrends et al’s Crude Domination each present oil as a curse, a challenge which communities 
must expel or adapt to in order to survive (Cepek 2018; Behrends, Reyna, and Schlee 2011). In 
Life in Oil, Cepek describes how the oil industry encroached on the autonomy of Ecuador’s 
Cofán people without any repercussions, even after lengthy court battles (Cepek 
2018). Similarly, Suzanna Sawyer’s Crude Chronicles details indigenous Ecuadorians’ 
resistance to the country’s neoliberal policies, which allowed American oil companies to drill on 
indigenous lands (Sawyer 2004). Sawyer shares their resistance efforts through the lens of 
indigenous political organizations for whom “There was no doubt…that neoliberal policies 
aiming to privatize, liberalize, and deregulate the economy were wreaking havoc on the majority 
 13 
of Ecuador’s population and creating a serious crisis of accountability” (Sawyer 2004, 215). 
These critiques applied particularly to the petrochemical industry and its history of damaging 
land and threating indigenous sovereignty. 
However, within these stories of resistance to the oil industry, more complicated 
narratives emerge. In Sawyer’s book, indigenous-led resistance efforts faced critiques from 
indigenous people who considered themselves “upstanding national citizens who knew how to 
respect the laws of the national government and who sought to better themselves through work. 
Yet, this was not just any work, it was work that furthered the state’s plan to increase petroleum 
production” (Sawyer 2004, 63). Sawyer’s study population was not a monolith, and while some 
were willing to risk their safety to resist oil’s domination, others saw the petrochemical industry 
as an asset that could lift indigenous Amazonian communities from poverty. For the same 
reasons that these individuals embraced petrochemicals, the Cofán community that is the focus 
of Cepek’s Life in Oil allowed the oil company to return to their land after decades of resistance 
(Cepek 2018). 
Support for oil in Louisiana’s and Mexico’s centers of petroleum production affirms 
these narratives of interdependence on oil. Despite concerns about pollution and environmental 
degradation, many community members seek the economic security that the oil industry’s 
sizable salaries promise. Yet, in stark contrast to the experiences of Cepek’s and Sawyer’s study 
populations, resource extraction dominated the economies of my study sites prior to oil’s 
emergence. In both Ciudad del Carmen and Morgan City, shrimp fishing was the primary 
economic activity when drilling began. The lumber industry in Campeche and the sugar industry 
in Louisiana also drew resources from the land without concern for long-term sustainability. The 
prior dependence of these communities on external markets and environmental degradation 
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distinguish their experiences from those of many indigenous communities affected by oil, which 
have been of interest to anthropologists. 
 This longer history of extraction does not alter the environmental impacts of oil 
production, but it positions them in a different political context, where resistance may be more 
difficult to achieve. Even as environmental degradation becomes more apparent, the 
beneficiaries of oil construct narratives to justify the industry’s continued existence. Arlie 
Russell Hochschild’s Strangers in Their Own Land presents a thorough and empathetic 
explanation of these pro-oil narratives in South Louisiana. They primarily center around the 
economy, distrust of the federal government, and the political agendas of Louisiana’s state and 
regional legislators (Hochschild 2016).  
The desire for jobs, wealth, and prosperity comes as no surprise, and the distrust of 
government support is explained by Hochschild’s theory of the “endurance self,” or people’s 
perceptions of themselves as capable to adapt as their homes change. She describes how 
Louisianians chose to sacrifice the natural spaces where they play, fish, and hunt in order to 
secure middle-class jobs in oil and gas. These decisions are supported by the community’s value 
of “endurance” or accepting challenges without complaint. She describes how her participants 
held on to ideals of loyalty, sacrifice, and stoicism that prevented them from resisting oil’s 
control in South Louisiana. The individualism and “us vs. them” mentality that arose from these 
views has made it easier for rural Southerners to trust local politicians than scientists (Hochschild 
2016). News sources and politicians cater to local interests, instill fear about government 
establishments and those who benefit from them, and cultivate a loyalty in Louisiana that has 
prevented resistance on a scale seen in many other sites, including Amazonian Ecuador. 
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Cepek, Sawyer, and Hochschild agree that a community’s support for oil ultimately 
hinges upon the economic costs or benefits that it offers to communities. Overall, ethnographic 
assessments of oil resistance demonstrate that finding balance between a prosperous economy 
and a healthy environment often leads to division among communities about how governments 
should regulate petrochemicals. In several cases, residents have organized impressive efforts to 
protect their lands from oil pollution. However, these analyses must be extended beyond 
assessments of whether people are explicitly for or against oil extraction and deregulation and 
how they defend those stances. More attention needs to be paid to individuals in oil-producing 
spaces not solely as political actors, but as individuals seeking a prosperous future in spite of the 
geopolitical instability of petrochemicals outlined by Watts. Decisions around activism and party 
affiliation are important, but they often depend on the sacrifices that oil-producing communities 
must make and how individuals prepare themselves to manage these trade-offs.  
Culture of moving in the oil industry 
The oil industry revolves around geography. Where there are oil reserves, cities are built 
or expanded to establish the infrastructure needed to support an influx of workers, equipment, 
and commerce. Consequently, there are a number of “oil towns” across the globe, like Ciudad 
del Carmen and Morgan City, that are starting points for the global flow of petroleum. Because 
oil infrastructure is concentrated around below-ground sources, the oil economy can feel 
hyperlocal; but because demand for oil stretches to all corners of the globe, the petrochemical 
industry is simultaneously very global. For oil workers, the distinction between the global and 
local economics of oil means that job opportunities may suddenly disappear in one’s hometown 
– and relocate to the other side of the globe.  
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Consequently, there is a subculture of travel and frequent relocations. This is exemplified 
particularly well by an individual who I interviewed in Louisiana. This participant and I met in 
the lobby of Morgan City’s Hilton Inn and Suites at 9pm on a Thursday night. She was only in 
town for a couple of weeks, like many of the town’s oil workers who are constantly on the move. 
She worked for a large company based in Houston, which she calls her home base, but she had 
been spending about 3 weeks each month in Morgan City for several months now as a project 
manager. She barely fit me into her schedule, which is no surprise given that she works 12-14 
hours per day when in Morgan City. 
During my conversation with this participant, I was surprised by her willingness to move 
around—this contrasted starkly with many other Louisiana participants. In spite of my other 
participants’ decisions to work in oil because it offered high-paying jobs near home, she 
described oil production as a profession that required moving, even noting that the need to move 
is a major barrier for women who want to have children: “It’s hard to be a working mom because 
it requires a lot of travel. They’ll put your kids in private schools because you have to move 
around, but you have to be careful if your kid is shy or something like that.” 
I interviewed two individuals in Louisiana, neither of them originally from the area, who 
were planning to leave the state in the near future; however, everyone I spoke to that had a 
family history in my study sites planned to stay. While better paid jobs go to those who are 
willing to move to them, people who are committed to a specific location can make it work, too. 
Spending weeks at a time offshore results in higher pay, although this schedule can strain 
families, especially when young children are involved. Technical skills and hazardous working 
conditions also contribute to increased salaries, so there are multiple paths to high wages in the 
oil field. This attracts local workers when the field is hiring, but even participants who were 
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committed to their hometowns frequently alluded to the need to travel and the benefits provided 
to those who could.  
Pemex’s national reach and political connections led the corporation to recruit primarily 
outside of the Ciudad del Carmen, and the most lucrative positions often went to outsiders. In 
general, the oil workers I interviewed in Ciudad del Carmen were well-educated individuals with 
office jobs; they immigrated to the area from other regions in Mexico or from other countries to 
work for Pemex. Because of an important Pemex office in the city, most who remained in the 
area through the downturn in the oil industry had relatively strong job security. Louisiana’s oil 
companies often recruited local workers to factories and extraction sites, so most participants 
there had family history in the region. Additionally, executive roles were often based in Houston 
or other large cities, so most oil workers in Louisiana worked in manual labor on ships and oil 
rigs, in contrast to the office jobs of Ciudad del Carmen. Their job security was more variable 
than in Mexico, but many were committed to remaining in the region because their parents and 
siblings lived nearby. 
Ultimately, the majority of my participants fell into the group of non-migrant oil workers. 
Even as the oil industry declined, they were able to remain in either South Louisiana or Ciudad 
del Carmen, but their towns had seen major population declines in the past few years, with my 
hosts in Ciudad del Carmen telling me that 60-70% of the city’s population had moved away 
since 2016. This may have been an exaggeration; it is difficult to estimate the city’s true 
population size with so many oil workers coming and going for offshore jobs. Either way, the 
individuals who remained in place throughout the decline in the oil industry had resisted leaving 
for some reason, in both Mexico and Louisiana.  
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Losing a land of opportunity  
As kids, my siblings and I frequently asked my parents when we would move back to 
New Orleans, where all three of us were born. No one in my family expected our relocation to 
Memphis, Tennessee to be permanent, including my parents. There were several reasons for the 
move: my maternal grandparents in Memphis could help with childcare, and we could afford a 
nicer home. But at the end of the day, my parents were worried about the effects that climate 
change would have on New Orleans, and they did not want to invest in property there. We 
happened to move two years before Hurricane Katrina hit the region, immersed our former home 
in 12 feet of water, and confirmed the validity of their fears. 
My family got lucky, helped along by my dad’s caution and interest in climate science. 
For many families in low-lying coastal areas, like Jacob’s, concerns about rising water levels are 
just now reaching a level somewhere between relevant and urgent; nothing needs to be done 
immediately, but change will soon be necessary. According to a report published just a few 
months before my fieldwork began, migration from the lowest-lying regions of Louisiana and to 
higher altitudes within the state is already occurring (“Our Land and Water: A Regional 
Approach to Adaptation” 2019). 
Similar to the land across South Louisiana dotted by canals and marshes, Ciudad del 
Carmen’s location on an island makes it a high-risk area for flooding and hurricanes. During my 
visit, the roads regularly flooded during afternoon showers, although I was lucky enough to 
avoid a more dangerous storm. Of course, on a rainy day on the neighboring island, the sandy 
roads became impassable much more quickly than the paved ones in Ciudad del Carmen. The 
money and infrastructure that oil brings into the town have been protective forces against 
extreme weather events. Many of these protective infrastructure changes are recent, however, 
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and adults from Ciudad del Carmen recalled that at the start of the 21st century the city still had 
“calles de pura arena, te iba en los huecos” [streets of pure sand, you would go into the holes]. It 
was impossible to drive a small car through the streets because of the road conditions. During my 
visit, I saw a few potholes, but nothing that would obstruct a small car, and every street in the 
city was paved. It was clear that several decades of oil money had given the area a large tax base 
to make improvements to the city’s infrastructure. 
When people moved into Ciudad del Carmen throughout the 90s and early 2000s, it was a 
rapidly expanding land of opportunity: “Para nosotros, Ciudad del Carmen es como una Estados 
Unidos, donde tu pasas y estás en otro pais, en otro nivel, en otro estatus… Ya le daba 
oportunidades de desarrollo.” [For us, Ciudad del Carmen is like a United States, where you pass 
and you are in another country, on another level, with a different status…And you are given 
opportunities to develop.] This quote comes from an interview with a couple in their mid-40s 
who moved to Ciudad del Carmen from Mérida in 1999. Both had received master’s degrees in 
environmental engineering, moved to Ciudad del Carmen immediately after graduation, and 
worked at the Pemex office there for 20 years.  
They did not want to leave Mérida, a city that they described as more beautiful, historic, 
and family-friendly, but they were paid four times as much in Carmen’s oil offices. The city’s 
petroleum industry was booming at the time, and there were lots of new hires. It became nearly 
impossible to find a home or a hotel room in the city: 
Era difícil encontrar una casa disponible porque estaban ocupados, todos ocupados 
mucho tiempo. Inclusivo a veces llegabas un fin de semana y no había ni hotel, pues 
cuando llegamos la primera vez casi no nos veíamos nada y dijimos pues nos quedamos 
en cualquier hotel, en cualquier hotel, siempre se reunían… Fuimos al centro a buscar, a 
buscar y no había, no había habitaciones disponibles. Había mal tiempo…una tormenta 
y bajo mucha gente de plataforma y estaban ocupados y era demasiada gente. 
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It was difficult to find a house available because they were occupied, all occupied all the 
time. Sometimes you arrived on a weekend and there was no hotel. When we came for 
the first time we hardly looked for anything and said we’d stay in any hotel, in any hotel, 
they always have something… We went downtown to search, search and there were no 
rooms available. There was bad weather…a storm, and a lot of platform workers came to 
town and they were busy and there were too many people. 
 
Eventually, the couple found a nice house in a gated community, settled in, and raised two 
children in the city. It was not much of a family place; many adults worked in Ciudad del 
Carmen and sent money back to family in Mérida, Veracruz, and other cities where the cost of 
living was lower. This couple never expected to work in the industry, much less move to Ciudad 
del Carmen for their entire adult lives and raise their kids there; however, the employment 
opportunities and the quality of life beckoned them, and they concluded that, “Ha sido positivo 
en nuestro aspect,” or “It has treated us well.”  
Recently, job opportunities like the ones they received had begun to disappear. This 
couple enjoyed living in Carmen in part because of the diversity; workers came from Columbia, 
Argentina, Venezuela, and the United States, as well as every region of Mexico. Two years ago, 
this diversity practically disappeared as “Todo, todo el mundo se fue. Que hubo despidos 
masivos así en número.” [Everyone, everyone left. There were massive layoffs.] In a city where 
most workers came from other places, the drop in oil prices precipitated major demographic 
changes, as well as the closures of many small businesses. The city of opportunities that people 
migrated to from places across the globe had disappeared.  
Transient oil workers, in particular, no longer came to Ciudad del Carmen. As another 
participant described the changing city: 
Cuando vino la caída del precio del petróleo a nivel internacional, muchas de las 
empresas que estaban en Carmen empezaron a cerrar y mucha gente que trabajaba en 
Ciudad del Carmen no era de Ciudad del Carmen. Entonces, ya sea que rentaba alguna 
casa o venían, trabajaban y luego se regresaban a su casa. Pues esa población que era 
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eventual empezó a desaparecer. Entonces ahorita el tráfico ha disminuido, las casas en 
renta hay más facilidad de encontrar. 
 
When the drop in oil prices at an international level happened, many of the businesses 
that were in Carmen began to close and a lot of people that worked in Ciudad del Carmen 
weren’t from Ciudad del Carmen. So, they were renting a house, or they came, worked, 
and then returned to their home. Well, that population that was transient began to 
disappear. So now the traffic has diminished, houses for rent are easier to find. 
 
Overall, there had been a radical shift in the city. It still had more wealth, infrastructure, and 
industry than most of Mexico, but it could no longer support its own population, much less draw 
in new workers.  
In South Louisiana, interview subjects also lamented the number of small businesses that 
were failing and talked about how hotels were empty. The stream of short-term oil workers who 
worked offshore was disappearing. However, only one of my participants directly mentioned 
layoffs. The owner of a small oil equipment company, he shared that “2014 was the best year 
we’d ever had, and 2015 was supposed to be better, and it was like somebody turned the lights 
off. And we went from 100-some-odd people, to 50.” He had to cut his employee base by half 
due to the rapid decline in the price of oil. Based on this speaker’s experience with layoffs and 
the recognition from many participants that small businesses were closing, the oil field’s decline 
was clearly affecting job security, so why didn’t anyone else talk to me about it? 
Rather than talking about job losses in the present, participants frequently described the 
oil industry as a job provider in the past. As the oil executive shared, when the industry was 
starting out in the state in the 1940s and 50s, “Everybody gained something. Everybody had a 
shot at a job.” He went on to affirm that oil had continued providing jobs in the area, sharing that 
“it always kept people employed.” This directly contradicted his own description of his 
company’s losses due to the downturn, but it fit with the political narrative described in 
Hochschild’s book, that middle-class jobs are worth environmental and cultural trade-offs, so the 
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oil industry must be supported. I suspect that the lack of discussion of job losses in Louisiana 
related to the 2014-16 oil price plummet is due to the fear that it will undermine the 
petrochemical industry’s tenuous status. Given the environmental threats posed by the oil field, 
job provision is a key justification that maintains support for oil, and it appears somewhat taboo 
to discuss the layoffs that began in 2015. 
In South Louisiana and in Ciudad del Carmen, the oil industry’s downturn signified a 
major shift. Small towns that had disproportionately large sums of money suddenly lost their 
advantage. Many lost their jobs and left the area. Others remained, watching spaces where 
opportunity once abounded close down. In Ciudad del Carmen, people spoke candidly about the 
effects of the downturn on their personal economic prospects and job opportunities, but in 
Louisiana, people became reticent when the topic of layoffs arose. As people clung to what was 
left of the oil industry and their hope for its revitalization, any discussion of oil’s negative impact 
on the job market threatened to disrupt the pro-oil political narrative that petrochemicals would 
allow rural Louisiana to flourish and its residents to live securely in the middle class. Their 
hesitation to address the layoffs reveals an important underlying question: What happens to the 
economy here if we cannot rely on oil jobs? Identifying precariousness in oil’s capacity to 
provide employment threatens their entire way of life, as well as their political narratives, but the 
job market they describe is strained and increasingly competitive. 
Climate change and expectations for the future 
In Designs for the Pluriverse, anthropologist Arturo Escobar reflects on the impending 
transitions that will affect all of human life as the climate crisis approaches. He writes:  
The literature on transitions makes it clear that transitions are not designed but emergent; 
they depend on a mix of interacting dynamic processes, both self-organized and other-
organized (by humans). Emergence, and this is one of its key principles, takes place on 
the basis of a multiplicity of local actions that, through their (largely unplanned) 
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interaction, give rise to what appears to an observer to be a new structure or integrated 
whole (say, a new social order or even civilization), without the need for any central 
planning or intelligence guiding the process. (Escobar 2018, 152) 
 
Based on this definition, my participants’ loss of faith that the petrochemical industry will 
continue providing jobs can be interpreted as a sign of emerging transitions in Ciudad del 
Carmen and South Louisiana. Moving away or returning to school can be interpreted as the kinds 
of “local actions” Escobar refers to, and they are occurring in these sites. Given their low-lying 
coastal geography and the volatility of the oil markets that their economies depend on, both 
Ciudad del Carmen and South Louisiana will likely experience the climate-induced transitions 
Escobar alludes to relatively early on. As our planet draws closer to becoming uninhabitable, 
these sites can help us understand how individuals will make the choices through which 
transitions emerge when they are confronted with newfound uncertainties. Through the Gulf’s oil 
producing towns, we can see how people working for the middle-class guarantee of security 
navigated a transition into precarious times.  
Given the declines in these towns’ economies and the culture of moving within the oil 
industry, staying in either Ciudad del Carmen or South Louisiana was not a given. Compounding 
these challenges, many of my participants did not anticipate long-term revitalization or even 
survival of their hometowns, especially in the context of climate change. When I entered these 
sites, I expected the communities there to doubt or resist the scientific narrative of environmental 
hazards. In reality, I encountered a broad range of perspectives on what climate change meant for 
the future of these sites and justifications for their continued reliance on natural resources.  
Generally, conversations about the oil industry’s effects on the local environment followed 
one of three paths: First, the oil industry has disrupted the environment, but it is making up for 
those impacts through new regulations or environmental improvement projects. Second, the oil 
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industry has disrupted the environment, but someone will produce it if we don’t. Third, the oil 
industry has disrupted the environment, and I disagree with their choices, but it provides for my 
family and/or community. Ultimately, each of these justifications accomplishes the same end. 
They shift the focus from the harms of the industry onto its benefits, with no direct comparison 
of the magnitude of harms or benefits. 
 What surprised me about these arguments is that they are rooted in the neoliberal, capitalist 
framework of trade-offs and opportunity costs. This makes sense in the United States, where the 
oil industry is purely privatized and supported by the Republican party’s capitalist agenda. It is 
more surprising in Mexico, where all oil workers are government workers. The similar responses 
in both study sites demonstrates how public industries operating in capitalist spaces enforce the 
same decision-making in employees as private ones.  
Further, the emphasis on these capitalist “trade-offs,” as one participant described them, 
differed vastly from scientific explanations of oil’s influence because they all focused on the 
present. Not one of my participants in Louisiana, in their interviews, brought up the long-term 
effects of the oil industry. They defended problems that have already become visible, rather than 
long-term concerns. Two examples from Louisiana are below:  
“The BP thing gave a real negative effect, uh, that’s really been overblown and just, a lot of it 
was unnecessary. They’ve got you now, where, there’s so much protection for something 
that, when it happens, there’s nothing else you can do. But, they’ve gone overboard… 
They’ve got the regulations so stiff, the cost of oil and gas goes up because of it.” 
 
“It’s no doubt that [the petrochemical industry has] affected our elevation, because we’ve 
pumped out, pumped fluid out the ground for years and years. Um, so, unfortunately I think 
it’s, uh, it’s leading to flooding in the area, and also saltwater intrusion which is a big 
problem for us. But you know, when we say impact the area, it’s also provided wealth for a 




These two stood out to me because the participants have such different backgrounds. The first 
speaker is a wealthy, conservative oil executive. The second is a middle-class petrochemical 
plant worker. Yet, both of them framed their concerns for the environment around concrete 
issues that have already been extensively documented in Louisiana. They made attempts to 
justify the current status, but neither mentioned how these issues will play out in the future, 
especially as the oil industry was hitting a low point economically. 
 A Mexican oil executive I spoke with approached the issue following the same pattern of 
delivering a current problem in the industry, followed by an attempt to overcome those concerns 
in favor of oil’s continuation: 
Sí, [la industria petrolera] afecta las condiciones ambientales. Hay un cambio en la 
naturaleza por la actividad del petroleo. En el mar, hay problemas, y en el suelo… Hacer 
esa remediacion del suelo sale muy caro, entonces… cumplen con todas las regulaciones 
ambientales. 
 
Yes, the oil industry affects environmental conditions. There are changes in nature caused 
by oil extraction activities. In the ocean, there are problems, and in the soil…Restoring 
the soil is very expensive, so… they comply with the environmental regulations. 
 
Coming from beneficiaries of the industry, the tendency to justify oil’s harms to the environment 
was no surprise. However, the framing of each justification around economic trade-offs places 
the environment in a unique position.  
 For the oil companies, environmental harms are simultaneously an externality and a key 
component of their costs. Complying with government regulations to preserve the environment is 
an important cost of doing business; however, harms that do not require remediation are purely 
externalities. In the economic choices of oil workers, on the other hand, there is no externality 
associated with the environment. Problems in their air, soil, and water directly affect workers 
who live near oil-production facilities, and these must be explicitly justified as petrochemical 
employees grapple with the trade-offs of their jobs.   
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 In the present tense, each of my interview subjects managed to justify oil’s presence in 
their communities; however, their avoidance of discussing the future indicated a lack of certainty 
about whether these justifications will hold up over time. Already, the second speaker’s 
qualification that the industry had provided wealth for many was being challenged by the 
industry’s downturn and extensive job losses in his community. As he later shared,  
[Houma’s economy] started to boom, and then it tapered off in the last few years, as far 
as the, you know, the job opportunities, and at one time, I think they had the lowest 
unemployment in the nation because of the oil field…For the first time in many years, 
real estate prices declined instead of increasing, and uh, there’s a lot more smaller 
businesses closing, you know, so I guess there’s been a big financial impact. 
 
This quote, coupled with the participant’s assertion that oil brought wealth to Houma, raises the 
question of how much money an environmentally-harmful industry must bring to a community 
in order to remain favorable. Clearly, the speaker had not reached a point where he was ready to 
give up on the oil industry, but he also did not express anticipation for improvements in the 
future. 
 Each of the participants mentioned above was an older career professional who saw no 
path beyond oil for themselves. They did not express a need to consider the future when oil 
brought positive benefits in the present. However, young people can hardly talk about their 
communities and professional experiences without looking towards the future. In addition to the 
many older professionals I spoke with, I interviewed Jacob’s son, Sam, who was about to start 
his associate’s degree to work in a petrochemical plant, and a 20-year-old resident of Morgan 
City named Miguel. 
 Besides their age, their profiles differ significantly. Sam gave up a four-year degree to 
pursue a more hands-on career, while Miguel was decidedly committed to graduating from a 
prestigious, four-year university. Sam had worked briefly on a tugboat that transported materials 
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to and from oil rigs but had a bad experience with the company, which prompted the shift to 
pursue work in a petrochemical plant. Within his first week of working on the boat, his pay was 
cut in half, to less than minimum wage, and broken equipment on the boat made the work 
dangerous. 
Some of his peers had better experiences entering the oil field, but their positions often 
depended on luck and connections: “A lot of people that I knew that weren’t going into the 
military or going to school, they were getting jobs on a tugboat or they knew someone who could 
get them one offshore. That’s usually how it went.” Having graduated from high school in 2017, 
his class entered the job market at a tough time in South Louisiana. Even as the country’s overall 
unemployment rate was relatively low, jobs were becoming more difficult to find in small oil 
towns like Houma, so people relied on family and friends for professional connections. However, 
Sam noted that tugboat jobs were often dangerous, and more technical offshore jobs were 
precarious—a friend of his made a single mistake on a rig and was fired on the spot. Between the 
problems with available jobs and the challenges of entering the industry in 2019, Sam had 
decided to prepare to enter the more stable field of chemical production: ““I wouldn’t get in the 
oil field right now cause it’s not booming the way it was, and that’s why I’m in school to work at 
a processing plant. People are always gonna need chlorine, Roundup, PVC.”  
Back in Ciudad del Carmen, Miguel’s peers had similar perspectives on working in oil, 
but he was far removed from them at the Universidad de Monterrey (UDEM). I was initially 
hesitant to interview Miguel because he had no work experience in the oil industry, but he was a 
recipient of a scholarship from the largest hydrogen production facility in the country—Pemex’s 
primary supplier of the chemical. The facility, located on the mainland across from Ciudad del 
Carmen, offered complete funding for a four-year degree at UDEM to 10 graduating high school 
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seniors across the state of Campeche as part of their social responsibility programming. Miguel’s 
status as a recipient of this scholarship made him a major beneficiary of oil’s influence in 
Carmen. 
  Despite the personal benefits he faced, Miguel saw that the industry’s influence in the 
lives of young people was declining. He shared with me: 
Pienso que…un poco más años atrás cuando, no sé, alomejor 10 años atrás, cinco años 
atrás, cuando la industria petrolera era muy grande, there were mucha gente que, pues, 
vivían muy bien de trabajar en Pemex, entonces muchas jóvenes aspiraban a seguir esos 
pasos, pero recientemente de este te comentaba que habido problemas, una crisis, con 
Pemex entonces siento que ahora es menos la demanda o el interese los jóvenes por 
estudiar o precisamente trabajar en Pemex.  
 
I think that…a few years ago when, I don't know, maybe 10 years ago, five years ago, 
when the oil industry was very big, there were a lot of people who, then, lived very well 
from working in Pemex, so many young people wanted to follow these steps, but 
recently, like I was telling you, there were problems, a crisis, with Pemex, so I feel like 
now there is less demand or interest from young people to study or, more specifically, 
work at Pemex. 
 
Unlike Sam, Miguel focused on office jobs in the industry, like the one his father held before he 
was laid off in 2015. For office work in the oil field, a four-year degree is required, which is a 
major investment if there are no jobs available upon graduation. Between Sam’s and Miguel’s 
explanations of young people’s prospects in the oil industry, it was clear that they did not see 
long-term wealth as a clear outcome of petrochemical work, even if those same jobs secured 
middle-class lifestyles for their families.  
Ultimately, in both Ciudad del Carmen and South Louisiana, the oil industry seemed to 
be declining as a potential career path. In both places, finding a job in the industry was more 
difficult, but also, the sudden changes in their local economies exposed young people to the 
volatility of the oil industry. Both Sam and Miguel expressed concerns about entering the oil 
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field not because they could not find jobs, but because those jobs had become less desirable 
when they and their peers realized how precarious the oil field could be. 
 That said, neither Miguel nor Sam thought that the oil industry was finished contributing 
to their towns’ economies. Sam expressed this idea by making concrete references to friends who 
had done well in oil: “Thing with the oil field is, you can get laid off when it’s slow, but you can 
also… I’ve got friends making a crazy amount of money, working in Texas, with no experience. 
I feel like it’s really hit or miss. You just gotta stick with it.” To him, examples of peers who 
made it through the oil industry’s downturn demonstrated that oil can still make people money; it 
just was not the right time for new workers to enter the industry, and he wanted to pursue a more 
predictable path.  
 Miguel conversation around the oil field’s future focused more on the need for 
diversification and innovation in the industry: “Yo siento que el área petrolera puede seguir 
trayendo muchos beneficios y progreso económico a México, pero siento que como cualquier 
evolución tienen que ir probándose nuevas tecnologías, nuevas fuentes de energía, nuevos 
recursos.” [I feel that the oil field can continue bringing many benefits and economic progress to 
Mexico, but I feel that, like any evolution, they must begin trying new technologies, new energy 
sources, new resources.] To him, the current failures of Mexico’s oil industry were not inherent 
in natural resource extraction in general; rather, they were the outcome of relying too heavily on 
past industrial practices without seeking opportunities for innovation. He specifically saw this as 
a threat to their relationship with the environment and noted the need for Mexico’s energy 
industry to develop solutions that balanced social, economic, and environmental needs.  
 All in all, oil workers and beneficiaries at all ages saw some sort of future for their 
communities in oil production. However, living in the midst of a downturn in the industry and 
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considering mounting evidence for oil’s environmental consequences, they did not express 
specific ideas about what that might look like. Mid-to-late career oil workers acknowledged that 
producing fuel required important trade-offs, with the environment often among the sacrifices, 
but avoided conversations about how future generations would make those cost-benefit choices. 
Meanwhile, the younger people I met explicitly told me that they were not interested in working 
in oil, although some of their peers had entered the field. While they acknowledged the potential 
economic benefits of oil work, they also saw in it a precarious future that did not guarantee the 
same lifestyle their parents worked for through the petrochemical industry. 
Confronting a precarious future through petrochemicals 
 The oil industry has always had ebbs and flows; no one is surprised by a bad year or two. 
The problem in South Louisiana and Ciudad del Carmen is that residents expect petrochemicals 
to continue declining. They are aware of the environmental impacts, even if they justify them as 
trade-offs made for a better life. When the industry is struggling and people are losing jobs, those 
justifications gradually lose their legitimacy. Petrochemical professionals avoiding conversations 
about layoffs and the industry’s future indicate a sense of uncertainty that is not being addressed. 
 In Strangers in their Own Land, Arlie Russell Hochschild delves into the importance of 
endurance in Louisiana. There is certainly a culture in Louisiana of working hard, even through 
tough times, but the oil workers I met there were not focused on enduring through whatever was 
thrown their way by the oil industry’s downturn. Rather, they avoided discussing layoffs and 
alternate futures because they did not see potential for prosperity beyond oil. The repetition by 
politicians, newscasters, and employers that oil would bring prosperity to the state led to the 
establishment of a system where “the oil and gas industry is the reason towns like Morgan City 
and Bayou Vista and some of the others have an active economy,” as one young oil worker told 
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me. In spite of oil’s precarities, no one was offering solutions for other ways to prosper, at least 
in mainstream Louisiana culture. These communities had sacrificed their environment, even the 
land they lived on, which was disappearing faster than any other coastal region in the Western 
Hemisphere, and they were not prepared to face those changes. 
 A similar problem is arising in Ciudad del Carmen. The town was shrinking, storefronts 
were closing, and residents were doubting the reasons that they moved there in the first place. 
Carmelinos spoke more readily about the economic transformation than Louisianans, noting the 
job losses and the need for a diversified economy. Ciudad del Carmen is a more urban site than 
Morgan City or Houma, and residents of the city still make far more than the average Mexican 
citizen. Their suffering differs from that of Louisiana in that they remain comparatively well-off. 
Meanwhile, Louisiana has the second-highest poverty rate in the country, in spite of the promises 
of big oil (“2019 Poverty Rate in the United States” 2020). 
 As mentioned previously, the experiences outlined here are not representative of all 
Ciudad del Carmen and South Louisiana residents, or of all oil industry workers. I have shared 
the stories of a group of middle-class people who benefit from the petrochemical industry, even 
as they critique it. The lack of non-white voices in the study population, in particular, excludes 
the narratives of Black and indigenous people who likely benefit and suffer from the 
petrochemical industry’s impacts in unique ways. It is telling that no participant in this study 
mentioned race in their interviews; I highly doubt that this would be the case if I interviewed 
Black Louisianians who work in the oil field, and further research should address the 
perspectives of non-white oil beneficiaries in both Louisiana and Mexico. Topics to explore 
include the experiences of non-white folks in rural Louisiana’s middle class and the legacies of 
slavery, sharecropping, and the plantation economy in Black communities’ relationships with oil.  
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While this paper focuses on white, middle-class oil beneficiaries, the global downturn in 
the petrochemical industry affected all parts of the Ciudad del Carmen and South Louisiana 
economies. The volatility of the market influences the lives of everyone who lives in oil-
dependent regions, and non-white oil beneficiaries are likely experiencing a shifting relationship 
with the industry, as well. For years, petrochemical companies were considered allies as South 
Louisiana residents strove to avoid reliance on “big government,” but the ongoing downturn in 
the oil industry seems to signal a shift in trust. My interview subjects relayed a lost sense of 
security, as they make trade-offs to preserve what they can through the changing economy. In 
2012, Watts’ “A Tale of Two Gulfs” predicted that this shift would emerge eventually, 
highlighting the ways that the Nigerian and Louisianan oil industries embrace more and more 
dangerous, unpredictable systems of production. He observed that the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster “reveals the deadly intersection of the aggressive enclosure of a new technologically 
risky resource frontier (the deepwater continental shelf in the Gulf), with the operations of what 
one can call neoliberalized risk, a lethal product of cutthroat corporate cost-cutting, the collapse 
of government oversight and regulatory authority, and the deepening financialization and 
securitization of the oil market” (Watts 2012, 463). Watts concluded that the compounded and 
increasing risks of market volatility, environmental degradation, and oil production methods 
were creating “[a] perfect storm of catastrophic risk: the unrelenting accumulation of insecurity” 
(Watts 2012, 463).  
 The 2014 drop in oil prices might not have reached the point of a catastrophe, and it is 
unlikely to be the last of the petrochemical industry’s hardships. However, responses to the 
downturn in oil-dependent towns like Ciudad del Carmen and Morgan City can illuminate how 
the oil industry’s overall insecurity is mitigated by the individuals who rely upon it. The 
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anthropology of oil has largely focused on petroleum as a geopolitical force and on oil-affected 
community members as political agents; however, these structural components of oil ultimately 
lead to individual decisions to adapt in a precarious industry. Regardless of political affiliations, 
residents of oil-dependent regions make trade-offs as a result of the volatility of the global forces 
that define their local economies. If we focus solely on their ongoing support of petroleum 
extraction, we risk overlooking the transformations that are beginning—through the “local 
actions” described by Escobar—in communities confronting the intertwined vulnerabilities 
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